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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
A declaratory judgment may be resorted to only when circum-
stances render it useful and necessary, where it will serve some
practical end in stabilizing or quieting an uncertain or disputed jural
relation as to present or prospective obligations. 6 Where mere ru-
mors cast doubt upon the marital status of the parties concerned, no
declaration by the court that it is false will be useful to suppress it.7
Equity will not restrain by an injunction an act which merely
injures a person's feeling and causes mental anguish.8 Casting doubt
upon one's position as a wife and consequent loss of social position
and reputation will not be enjoined by a court of Equity.9 Since
injunctions against immoral conduct open such a wide field of pos-
sible litigation with so much doubt of effective results, and strong
probability that the administration of the law might be made an
object of ridicule, it will not be expedient to extend equitable relief
in those cases of injuries to family relations.1 ° It is well settled that
equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime.1" Under the law
it is a matter of their own consequences. The same may be said of
individual morals.' 2  Any attempt to regulate the morals of the
people by injunctions can only result in making ridiculous the courts
which grant such decrees. 13  The injured wife may resort to other
remedies. A civil suit may be maintained for *alienation of affections
or criminal conversation against the paramour,'14 or the wife may
have her husband prosecuted criminally for his adultery.15
I. L. K.
DYING DECLARATIONS-ADMISSIBILITY.-The defendant was
convicted of poisoning his wife. At the trial the Prosecutor offered
in evidence a conversation between the deceased and her nurse, in re-
buttal to a suicidal intent set up by the defense. The evidence was
'James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 49 (1931);
Wardrop v. Fairfield Gardens, 237 App. Div. 605, 262 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1st
Dept. 1933) ; Marine Lighterage Corp. v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 139 Misc. 612,
248 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1931).
'Instant case; cf. Bauman v. Bauman, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819
(1929).
'Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (D. C. W. D.
Mo. 1912); Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163(1902); Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899).9Supra note 5. Contra: Bums v. Stevens, 236 Mich. 443, 210 N. W.
482 (1926).
"' Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality
(1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 674. Contra: instant case, Crane, J., dissenting
opinion.
' Supra note 7.2 Ibid.
Ibid.
WALSH, EQUITY (1930) §52.
'N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §§100-103.
RECENT DECISIONS
rejected, but was later received upon the ground that it was a dying
declaration, upon proof that the deceased said "she was not going
to get well, she was going to die." At that time, two days after the
illness started, there was no diagnosis of poison, and the attending
physicians had not considered her seriously ill. Death was the re-
sult of a relapse, which occurred two weeks later. Held, inadmissible
as there was no belief in impending death and abandonment of hope
of recovery. Slhepard v. U. S., -U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 22 (1933).
To admit an ante mortem statement of the deceased as to the
cause of his condition and the circumstances surrounding it,' it must
appear that at the time of the declaration, the victim was in danger
of death, and believing this, had abandoned all hope of recovery.
2
These requirements need not be expressed by the victim verbally,
they may be signified by signs 3 or inferred from the circumstances.
4
Their purpose is to have some indemnity against deception, to be
found in the awe of that moment and the abandonment of temporal
aims.5 Since this mental security is the foundation of the admissi-
bility,6 it is apparent that the statement must be made by the victim,
7
and if made while this pledge of truth is present, it does not matter
that he survive for some time.8
The credibility of the declarant may be attacked by showing
the presence of other motives antagonistic to truth, such as hatred
and revenge.9 He is subject to the testimonial disqualifications of an
"People v. Morse, 196 N. Y. 306, 89 N. E. 816 (1909) ; People v. Stacy,
119 App. Div. 743, 104 N. Y. Supp. 615 (3rd Dept. 1907).
2 Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159 (1878); People v. Smith, 172 N. Y.
210, 64 N. E. 814 (1902); People v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624
(1903); People v. Del Verno, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690 (1908); People v.
Governale, 193 N. Y. 581, 86 N. E. 554 (1908); People v. Morse, supra note
1; People v. Madas, 201 N. Y. 349, 94 N. E. 857 (1911) ; People v. Falleto,
202 N. Y. 494, 96 N. E. 355 (1911); People v. Saranzo, 212 N. Y. 231, 106
N. E. 87 (1914); People v. Kane, 213 N. Y. 260, 107 N. E. 655 (1915); People
v. Evans, 40 Hun 492 (N. Y. 1886) ; People v. Burt, 51 App. Div. 106, 64 N.
Y. Supp. 417 (3rd Dept. 1900); People v. Stacy, supra note 1; People v.
Brecht, 120 App. Div. 769, 105 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st Dept. 1907); People v.
Mikulec, 207 App. Div. 505, 202 N. Y. Supp. 551 (3rd Dept. 1924); People v.
Flaherty, 218 App. Div. 204, 218 N.. Y. Supp. 148 (4th Dept. 1926); People v.
Weiss, 261 N. Y. Supp. 646, 147 Misc. 595 (1932).
People v. Madas, supra note 2.
People v. Falleto, supra note 2.
People v. Saranzo, supra note 2; 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§1443.
'People v. Saranzo, sapra note 2.
'People v. Becker, 215 N. Y. 126, 109 N. E. 127 (1915).
8 People v. Weiss, supra note 2; State v. Bruno, - Iowa -, 132 N. W. 817
(1911); State v. Brown, - La. -, 135 So. 818 (1904); Reeves v. State, -
Miss. -, 64 So. 836 (1914); State v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 194
(1903) ; State v. Colvin, 226 Mo. 446, 126 S. W. 817 (1911).
Reeves v. State, supra note 8.
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ordinary witness o such as insanity," lack of knowledge, 12 self-
serving declarations,' 3 prior commission of a felony, 14 failure to un-
derstand questions 15 and disbelief in God.' 6
The declaration is to be restricted to a statement of the cause
of death and the attending circumstances, the res gestae Y1 It must
contain definite -s facts,19 to which the declarant could testify if
alive 2 0 not opinions and conjectures.2 '
Although originally applicable to all types of cases, the use of
this exception to the Hearsay Rule, in the 18th century was restricted
to criminal cases, 22 and later by statute was applied in indictments
for abortion.23  The constitutional right of the accused to be con-
fronted with his accuser has been held not to have been violated by
the use of dying declarations; that the deceased is not a witness with-
in the meaning of the constitution, and it is sufficient if the witness
who testifies as to the declaration is present.
2 4
C. T. S.
ACTIONS--HusBAND'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR Loss OF WIFE'S
CONSORTIUM AGAINST VENDOR WHO SOLD HER CONTAMINATED
FOOD.-The vendor sold to the plaintiff wife a quantity of crabmeat,
which proved to be contaminated and the plaintiff wife became ill
from the consumption thereof. The wife and her husband brought
concurrent actions against the vendor, the wife for breach of implied
"03 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (2d ed.) §1445.
'Lipcomb v. State, - Miss. -, 22 So. 188 (1897); Reeves v. State,
supra note 8.
" Jones v. State, - Miss. -, 30 So. 759 (1901); Reeves v. State, supra
note 8.
" Patterson v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 807, 75 S. E. 737 (1912).
" State v. Baldin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 Pac. 650 (1896).
"People v. Saranzo, supra note 2; People v. Kane, mtra note 2.
" State v. Razell, - Mo. -, 225 S. W. 931 (1920).
' People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (1874); People v. Smith, supra note 2;
Hackett v. People, 54 Barb. 370 (N. Y. 1886) ; Walton v. State, - Miss. -,
126 So. 29 (1930); State v. Colvin, supra note 8.
" Odum v. State, 13 Ga. App. 687, 79 S. E. 858 (1913); Castillo v. State,
- Tex. -, 69 S. W. 517 (1902).
"Berry v. State, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. W. 1038 (1897); People v. Shaw,
63 N. Y. 36 (1897) ; People v. Falleto, supra note 2.
People v. Shaw, Berry v. State, both supra note 19.
"Brotherton v. People, supra note 2; People v. Smith, supra note 2;
People v. Falleto, supra note 2; Maine v. People, 9 Hun 113 (N. Y. 1876);
Jones v. State, supra note 12; Berry v. State, supra note 19.
"People v. Falleto, supra note 2; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§1432.
'N. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1909) §398a; 3 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) §1432.
"State v. Colvin, supra note 8; People v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 67 N. E.
303 (1898).
